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Abstract
Sociotechnological theory seeks to understand technology as both material and social artifacts. Actor-Network
Theory (ANT) offers an approach to sociotechnological theory that emphasizes a micro-level analysis of
political strategies, but has been criticized for not considering larger social and cultural processes. This paper
presents an approach to sociotechnological theory that links the enrollment process of ANT with broader social
practices, and social group memberships. Two case studies of Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) evolution
(Psion, led by David Potter, and Palm, led by Jeff Hawkins) are used to illustrate this approach.

Introduction: Sociotechnological Theory in IT Research
Sociotechnological theory seeks to understand technology as both material and social artifacts. A long tradition of technological
change research has identified the importance of theoretical concepts that do not distinguish a priori between the
technological/scientific and the social/cultural/economic/political aspects of technological change (Bijker, 1995). In the world
of information technology (IT) research, this tradition has influenced the use of ‘ensemble’ theories of IT change, which have been
used to understand the dynamic interactions of people and technology during IT development and use (Orlikowski and Iacono,
2001).
No approach to sociotechnological theory has attracted more recent attention in IT research than Actor-Network Theory (ANT),
developed by Latour and colleagues. A review of Actor-Network Theory in IT research cites examples of its application to IT
development, IT-enabled organizational change, computer-mediated communication, and infrastructure standards (Walsham,
1997). The only other sociotechnological theory that could arguably be seen as having a similar impact is the extension of
structuration theory developed by Orlikowski (2000), though it has not been used yet beyond her own research.
A major focus of Actor-Network Theory is to explain how stable networks of aligned interests are created and maintained by both
human and non-human ‘actants’. “Successful networks of aligned interests are created through the enrollment of a sufficient body
of allies, and the translation of their interests so that they are willing to participate in particular ways of thinking and acting which
maintain the network.” (Walsham, 1997) The major attraction of ANT for IT research, and one of its most controversial
elements, is its symmetric treatment of people and technologies as aligned interests. The concept of a non-human ‘actant’ (i.e.,
an information technology), influencing a network on the basis of the interests and assumptions inscribed within it, is one that
has an undeniable appeal for understanding the IT world of today, where pre-packaged systems and global standards are routinely
transplanted between very different use contexts.
One of the main critiques of ANT is its focus on local, contingent aspects of sociotechnical change, at the expense of broader
social and cultural processes. The almost exclusive focus in ANT studies of the micro-politics of alliance-building has been
described as Machiavellian, paying little attention to the influence of institutional or cultural routines (Layne, 1998). In his
review, Walsham (1997) is unconvinced by the responses of the ANT advocates to this criticism, and suggests combining ANT
with theories of social structure such as structuration theory. How exactly to combine the micro-politics of ANT with the broader
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social and cultural context remains an important issue in sociotechnological theory, and therefore one for IT research as a whole
(Orlikowski and Barley, 2001).

Enrollment in Context: Sociotechnical Configurations
Recent work by Bijker (1992, 1995) provides a means for linking enrollment activities with broader social and cultural processes.
Three of Bijker’s concepts are important for making this link: technological frames, inclusion, and configurations.
For Bijker, a technological frame structures interactions among the actors of a social group. A technological frame consists of
“all the elements that influence interaction…and lead to the attribution of meanings to technical artifacts” (Bijker, 1995).
Following Kuhn’s (1970) concept of a disciplinary matrix (or, more informally, a paradigm) in the natural sciences, Bijker’s
technological frame provides for a social group:
•
•
•
•
•

Goals for a technology
Key problems to be solved by a technology
Problem solving strategies
Requirements to be met by solutions
Exemplary artifacts

These elements of a technological frame both enable and constrain certain kinds of action, following Giddens’ (1984) concept
of structuration in social interaction. A technological frame “guides future practice, though without logical determination” (Bijker,
1995)—it offers a powerful way of both seeing the world with respect to a technology, and a set of strategies and examples for
how to successfully develop and use a technology, but it does not dictate how interaction around a technology takes place.
Technological frames are maintained by social interaction. They are also, of course, changed by social interaction, and an
important source of dynamism in Bijker’s theory comes from the concept of inclusion in a technological frame. Inclusion is “to
what extent the actor’s interactions are structured by that technological frame” (Bijker, 1995). Earlier versions of the social
construction of technology (SCOT) approach, for which Bijker is probably most famous, described social groups as fairly
monolithic, with basically fixed ideas about the appropriate problems and solution with regards to a technology. The concept of
inclusion opens up new possibilities. Actors may have a high degree of inclusion in a technological frame, in which they are both
heavily influenced and greatly skilled, or they may have a lower degree of inclusion, which perhaps makes them less skilled but
more open to the influence of other technological frames. Actors can be participants in multiple technological frames, translating
both problems and solutions across social boundaries.
A classic example of technological frames and inclusion comes from Bijker’s study of Leo Baekeland, the inventor credited with
developing the first synthetic plastic. According to Bijker, Baekeland participated in two different technological frames: the
frame of Celluloid chemists, who were trying to develop a substitute for natural plastics to be used for fancy articles such as
buttons and billiard balls; and the frame of photo chemists, who were trying to create better materials and processes for
photography. For Celluloid chemists, the key problem solving strategy was to find new and better combinations of solvents that
would produce an artificial plastic that was less flammable and cheaper. Progress, measured relative to the goals of the Celluloid
chemists’ frame, was slow. Baekeland shared the overall goal of the Celluloid chemists’ technological frame, but also actively
participated in the photo chemists’ frame, where the main problem solving strategies included the careful variation and study of
process parameters, such as the amount of heat and pressure applied to a reaction. This was not a common way of conceptualizing
the problem in the Celluloid chemist frame. By drawing from his interactions within both technological frames, Baekeland was
able to create a practical process for making Bakelite, the first widely-used synthetic plastic.
Bijker’s third concept divides sociotechnological change into three distinct types, or configurations, depending on whether no
clearly dominant technological frames shapes interactions, one technological frame is dominant, or two or more technological
frames are important. According to Bijker (1995), each configuration is associated with a different sociotechnological change
process. When no technological frame is dominant, innovations should be plentiful and radically different. The most important
change process when no frame dominates is the enrollment process described by ANT, which tries to create a new constituency
that can stabilize a sociotechnological innovation. In other configurations, different change processes become more important.
When two or more technological frames dominate, Bijker’s theory claims that rhetoric and compromise (his ‘amalgamation of
vested interests’) are the most important change processes, while the search for improvements within the parameters of a given
frame (his ‘functional failure’ and ‘presumptive anomalies’) are most critical when one technological frame dominates interaction.
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Taken together, the three concepts of technological frame, inclusion, and configurations link together detailed enrollment activities
and larger social and cultural processes. Enrollment is one important change process, but its importance depends on the
configuration of technological frames guiding social interaction. Even within a single technological frame, varying degrees of
inclusion open up the possibility of multiple technological frames, each with their own definitions of reasonable problems and
solutions, having an influence on the enrollment process.

Case Study Objectives and Design
The two case studies discussed in this paper are part of a larger research project to understand the evolution of emerging
information technologies (IT) from a sociotechnological point of view. In particular, the research project focuses on the question
of how newly emerging IT stabilizes into an accepted form, and why new technologies take the form they do. In the handheld
computer industry, also known as the Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) industry, the decade of 1987-1997 saw the introduction
of many radically different designs, but by the end of that decade the first stable, generally accepted form emerged around the
design of the original PalmPilot—a small, relatively simple ‘connected organizer’ with long battery life, a focus on personal
information management (PIM) applications such as calendar and address book, pen-based character recognition, and easy
synchronization with a personal computer (PC). Among the 34 companies that released handheld computer products during this
period, and the many others who never got a product out the door, only two had sold more than one million units by 1997: Psion
and Palm. The case studies analyze the process through which Palm and Psion were able to establish stable new technological
forms, and why they took the form they did.
The two case studies use the theory of sociotechnological change developed by Bijker (1995), as described in the previous section.
The cases use technological frames, inclusion, and configurations as sensitizing concepts to guide the selection and interpretation
of the data. The data used in the cases came from three sources: a database of the 71 consumer-oriented handheld computers
released by North American and European companies between 1987 and 1997; a collection of 425 trade press articles over the
same period, taken from the ABI/Inform Global database; and 25 in-depth interviews producer company employees, user
representatives, and industry analysts. Within the broad parameters specified by the theoretical perspective, standard qualitative
data analysis techniques such constant comparison, theoretical saturation, and the search for negative cases were used (Strauss,
1987).
The presentation of the case studies is outlined in Table 1. In each case, the company was able to establish a stable new
technological form, enrolling the sustained interest of a set of producers, investors, and consumers. For each form, an exemplary
artifact served as part of an organizing definition in an emerging technological frame. The new technological form is then
discussed from the standpoint of how the problem of handheld computing was redefined, in an attempt to enroll groups that had
not yet been successfully drawn into the handheld computing world up to that point. The inclusion of key players at Psion and
Palm in different technological frames is used to account for the source of their ‘counterintuitive’ problem definitions that resulted
in successful enrollment. Their inclusion in technological frames is also used to account for examples of ‘successful resistance’:
how they were able to avoid redefinitions that led to many unsuccessful enrollment attempts in the emerging handheld computer
industry.
Table 1. Case Study Elements
Sociotechnological Concept
New Technological Form
Problem Redefinitions
Technological Frames

‘Successful Resistance’

Psion
Palmtop Organiser
Exemplary artifact: Series 3 (1991-)
- Low power/Battery life
- PIM applications
- PC industry
- UK computer industry
- Industrial (vertical) applications
- Palmtop
- Pen-based computer/PDA
- Personal communicator

Palm
Connected Organizer
Exemplary artifact: PalmPilot (1996-)
- Pen input (Graffiti)
- Synchronization with PC
- PC industry
- Pattern recognition research
- Consumer electronics industry
- Palmtop
- Pen-based computer/PDA
- Personal communicator
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Case Study: Psion
Psion PLC was founded as a PC software company in 1980 by David Potter, a professor of mathematical physics at UCLA and
Imperial College. Concerned about the increasing level of competition, and the growing capital requirements of PC software,
Psion changed in the early 1980s from a software company to a handheld computer company, releasing their first handheld
computer (the “Organiser”) in 1984. Psion introduced a modestly successful industrial handheld (the “HC”), and a commercially
disastrous notebook-sized computer with solid-state storage and long battery life (the “MC”), before releasing the first Series 3
handheld in 1991.
The Series 3 adopted the same ‘clamshell’ form factor as the existing palmtop computers of the day (for example, the Atari
Portfolio and Fujitsu Poqet PC), using a small keyboard as the only input device. It differed from existing palmtops in two
important ways. First, it was designed from the ground up to be a low power device, using solid-state storage to achieve long
battery life. This meant designing a new operating system from scratch (the 16-bit ‘SIBO’ platform), rather than assuming that
using a PC compatible operating system such as DOS was a prerequisite for successfully establishing a new technological form.
Second, the Series 3 was designed to have very easy to use personal information management (PIM) applications, such as
scheduling and contacts information, available at the touch of a button. With these redefinitions of the handheld computer concept
came shifts in the enrollment strategy of Psion, in contrast with other handheld producers. The consumers were redefined as
executives and professionals, rather than existing PC users who wanted mobility, resulting in design, marketing, and distribution
decisions focused on busy executives rather than technophiles. Instead of the traditional PC industry emphasis on enrolling
strategic partners and independent software vendors, Psion focused much more attention on enrolling suppliers and subcontractors
to control the entire ‘user experience’ of the Palmtop Organiser. Using these enrollment strategies, Psion was able to establish
the Series 3 as the exemplary artifact in a sustainable new technological community.
The source of Psion’s different (and relatively successful) enrollment strategies can be seen in terms of technological frames and
inclusion. Though Potter and his initial management team were mathematical physicists, they were all heavily involved in
computer technology, and saw the industry largely in terms of computing. Successful handhelds for them would basically be
computers, with a computer CPU and hardware architecture, an operating system, and separate applications software. As late
as 1996, Psion was still announcing their new products with the slogan “A Computer For Every Pocket”. In contrast to other
palmtop computer companies, however, Psion participated in two other very different social worlds. One was the unique world
of the British PC industry, which in the early 1980s had a 24% share of global PC sales, almost entirely on the strength of Sinclair
products (Langlois, 1992). The early Sinclair computers, such as the ZX81, were influential for Psion in showing that very small,
relatively low power devices could be successful—moving from a ZX81 to a small handheld was a small conceptual leap in the
UK. In the US, the IBM PC was the exemplary artifact, and the ZX81 was a ‘side show’. Second, Psion was unique in the early
handheld industry because it designed computers for both mass-market consumers and niche ‘vertical’ industry applications.
Psion entered the world of industrial applications by accident, after some early industrial successes with the original Organiser
product, but became heavily involved with the introduction of the HC range. Psion was able to draw upon industrial experience
with more expensive, cutting edge technologies, such as new screens and wireless communications, before they ever became
practical for a mass-market audience.
Psion, with its Series 3, was not only able to establish a new technological form that differed from its palmtop predecessors, it
was also able to ‘successfully resist’ many of the trendy, ‘obvious’ ideas about the future of handhelds in the industry’s early
chaotic phases. The first case of ‘successful resistance’ already mentioned above was to modify the palmtop form, which argued
that successful handhelds should be smaller versions of existing PCs. Psion was also able to resist the pen-based computer craze
that swept through the industry in the early 1990’s by drawing upon its inclusion in other technological frames besides the
traditional PC industry. Every major PC company of the day (including Apple, IBM, Microsoft, Tandy, and Compaq) pursued
the dream of a small tablet device with intelligent freeform handwriting recognition, a product intended to serve a mass market
of ‘technophobes’ who were intimidated by keyboards and other PC complexities. While PC companies busily enrolled venture
capital and software partners for a mass-market assault, Psion drew upon its experience with mobile professionals to argue that
reliable data input through a keyboard was crucial for enrolling their defined set of customers. Though Psion’s management team
thought the ‘death of the keyboard’ idea was evidence that ‘the industry went mad’, Psion management organized a US study tour
in late 1993. The director of Psion Computing assessed their findings as follows:
“We visited the USA to see the pen platform, Microsoft, everyone. We asked them why they did this? Why
leave out the keyboard? It was a management axiom that they should start with a pen…they had bought
Sculley’s concept [of a pen-based PDA like the Apple Newton] and we’d better do that just in case he’s right.
It was a given.
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For us, it was an example of West Coast groupthink. If we’d been in California, would we have been sucked
into that? But we weren’t immersed in it. We asked ourselves: did we know more about the market, or were
we on a different planet?” (Interview, December 1997)
Following the commercial failure of the Apple Newton in 1994, the pen-based computer concept fell out of fashion. Another
proposed technological form for a handheld computer arose: the personal communicator. During this phase, many of the major
telecommunications companies (including AT&T and Motorola) proposed handhelds based on the assumption that wireless
communications was the key to success. Producers tried to enroll large telecommunications companies as resource and
infrastructure providers, and ‘content providers’ to create the content that would drive network traffic. Psion drew upon its
interactions with the industrial applications frame to reason that wireless communications was still too difficult and expensive
for mass-market use. By drawing upon its inclusion within the industrial applications frame, with its different problems and
solutions already at play, Psion was once again able to ‘successfully resist’ what in retrospect was an unsustainable technological
fad.

Case Study: Palm
Palm Computing was founded in 1992 by Jeff Hawkins as an application software company for handheld computers. Palm
supplied the PIM applications, handwriting recognition, and the PC connectivity software for the Casio/Tandy Zoomer handheld,
introduced soon after the Apple Newton in 1993. Palm supplied handwriting recognition and PC connectivity software for other
handhelds, until a frustration with existing products led them to develop their own handheld computer. Their first handheld, the
PalmPilot, was released in 1996, and quickly became one of the fastest selling consumer products of all time.
Given the state of the handheld computer industry in the mid 1990s, when widespread disillusionment had set in after the
disappointing performance of pen-based computing and personal communicators, the original PalmPilot was a radical departure
from conventional wisdom. The PalmPilot was small enough to fit in a shirt pocket, used a pen rather than a keyboard, and had
relatively little computing power and memory. Two redefinitions were particularly important. First, the PalmPilot used pen input
at a time when pen-based computing was blamed for the high-profile failure of the Apple Newton and similar handhelds. Instead
of recognizing freeform handwriting, however, the PalmPilot used a technology called Graffiti invented by Hawkins. Graffiti
forced the end user to write one character at a time, requiring users to learn a simplified new alphabet. The second major
redefinition is reflected in the name that Palm gave to their new products: Connected Organizers. The PalmPilot was designed
around the assumption that the handheld computer user would also have a PC. The design of the PalmPilot made it extremely
easy to connect to a PC and synchronize PIM data.
As in the Psion case, these redefinitions called for different enrollment strategies from what was then the industry norm. Using
a simplified handwriting recognition technology, developed in-house, radically decreased the hardware and software requirements
of the PalmPilot. This redefinition allowed Palm to develop the PalmPilot using their existing resources, rather than having to
sell outside investors and potential partners on a new and unproven technology concept. For end consumers, the enrollment
message shifted from accurate handwriting recognition to the simplicity and ease-of-use of the PalmPilot’s PIM applications.
Redefining the handheld as a PC companion also shifted Palm’s enrollment tactics away from technophobes with no previous
computing experience—the message of pen-based computing—and towards technophile early adopters who were already
comfortable with PCs. By connecting through PCs to outside networks, rather than relying on wireless communications, Palm
removed the need to enroll wireless infrastructure providers, a major stumbling block even today because of the expense and
coverage of wireless networks.
The source of Palm’s unique problem redefinitions, resulting in different enrollment strategies, can be seen as the inclusion of
Palm’s founders in different technological frames. As in the Psion case, the successful handheld for Palm would basically be a
computer, with a typical computer hardware architecture, an operating system platform for developing new applications, and
separate application software. Palm’s founders all had years of experience in the California PC industry, at companies such as
Intel and Apple. Palm also absorbed existing features of the Palmtop Organiser technological frame, such as low power
requirements and easy access to PIM applications. Probably the most surprising redefinition was the use of Graffiti handwriting
recognition. Though difficult to appreciate in retrospect, this was a technology so counterintuitive that no independent analyst,
and even few within Palm itself, could see it as a viable handheld computer technology. Making end users ‘learn a new way of
writing’ went completely against the founding assumptions of the handheld industry. Jeff Hawkins, however, did graduate work
in biophysics at Berkeley, and was peripherally involved in the pattern recognition and neural network research community. From
this unique experience base, Hawkins was able to see the potential of Graffiti. Through their experience with the Casio/Tandy
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Zoomer product, Palm was exposed to the very different world of consumer electronics, where ‘out of the box’ experience and
low price points take on much more importance than in the PC world. Even though it was a commercial failure, it was primarily
through their surveys of Zoomer users that the key performance criteria of PC connectivity became a major focus.
By drawing upon their (peripheral) inclusion in other technological frames, Palm was able to ‘successfully resist’ many of the
industry’s key beliefs. Following the lead of Psion and others, it was relatively easy to grasp that the ‘palmtop’ notion of handheld
as shrunken PC was not a sustainable new form. Much more difficult to resist was the idea that, because of the failure of products
like the Apple Newton and the Casio/Tandy Zoomer, that ‘the pen was dead’. Jeff Hawkins was able to draw upon his experience
in the world of pattern recognition research to see that a new and different kind of pen input could ultimately be a stable new
technological form for a substantial audience of end consumers. With their redefinition of handhelds as a connected organizer,
drawn from their experience in the consumer electronics world, the key problem of the proposed ‘personal communicator’ form
became much less significant. Rather than having to wait for cheap, ubiquitous wireless communications to become a reality,
Palm was able to draw upon the strengths of the PC while still creating a relatively easy to use consumer device.

Discussion: Enrollment as Problem Redefinition
In Bijker’s (1995) theory, the enrollment process described by ANT is the most important sociotechnological change mechanism
within a particular configuration: no dominant technological frame. The early evolution of PDAs, as presented in this study,
supports Bijker’s claim that enrollment, rather political negotiation or the search for solutions within a shared problem space, is
the major sociotechnological change mechanism. Bijker went further, however, in claiming that problem redefinition is a
particularly important type of enrollment. In both the Psion and Palm cases, redefining a technological problem to enroll a
different set of social groups played a crucial role.
Given ANT’s usual focus on micro-politics and negotiation tactics, the example of PDA evolution is useful for reminding us that
enrollment is not only a matter of negotiation and power plays. It is perhaps obvious to conclude at the end of an ANT-type study
that the secret to establishing a new technological form is to “create [a] network of aligned interests” and that technologists should
“enroll stakeholder groups to align their interests with the technology” (Walsham and Sahay, 1999). Many actors in the handheld
computer world made what, in retrospect, appears to be the mistake of spending too much time and energy enrolling the ‘wrong’
social groups, forming ‘grand alliances’ with other producers and investors. The challenge of establishing a new technological
form is to include or exclude a non-obvious set of social groups in a new technology definition, as well as to bring these social
groups on-board.

Discussion: Linking Enrollment and Social Group Practices
This paper began with the critique of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as too focused on the micro-politics of enrollment, at the
expense of broader social and cultural processes. How can an ANT approach to IT research maintain a balance between actororiented and structure-oriented aspects of sociotechnological change? Where, in other words, does the enrollment process meet
structure?
Bijker’s concepts of technological frames, inclusion, and configurations provide one way of making this link. As the Psion and
Palm cases illustrate, these concepts allow an analyst to trace the influence of a larger structural background—to group practices
around a technology which are relatively stable—while still creating a detailed account of how enrollment took place in a specific
case. In these cases, our understanding of the details of the enrollment process is aided by an account of existing community
practices around a technology (the technological frames), and the participation of key actors in those communities (inclusion).
In both the Psion and Palm cases, the sources of their unique problem definitions and enrollment strategies have their roots in
larger social group practices. Their view of the PDA world, and their ability to skillfully act in the PDA world, was most shaped
by their participation in the technological frame of the PC industry, from which they adopted many of their established problem
definitions and solution strategies. Their successful establishment of new technological forms, however, requires reference to
places outside normal PC industry practice. How was it that these companies, and not others with much more resources, were
able to establish new forms, and do it in such a unique way? The intended contribution of the cases was to identify exactly how
each of these companies redefined the problem of the PDA, and the sources of these redefinitions in community practices outside
the PC industry.
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Conclusion
Using the concepts of technological frames, configurations, and inclusion, it is possible to create a link between the details of
enrollment activities, and larger social and cultural processes. This approach addresses one of the central problems of
sociotechnological theory identified by Bijker (1995): maintaining the balance between actor-oriented and structure-oriented
explanations of technological change. More specifically, however, this approach allows us to extend and deepen our
understanding of enrollment. Enrollment through mechanisms such as problem redefinition can be just as, if not more, important
than obvious political tactics such as negotiation and rhetoric. And the sources of ideas for enrollment can be found in the
inclusion of key individuals and organizations in different social groups, such as the pattern recognition social world in the Palm
case, and the peculiarities of the British personal computer industry in the Psion case.
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